Human "Enhancement"

Human Enhancement, Rights, and the Venture Beyond Humanity

Jennifer Guon
Research Assistant
Institute on Biotechnology & the Human Future

One must start an analysis on human enhancement with the simple question: Do we, as human beings, possess a fundamental right to enhance ourselves? This broad initial inquiry, however, then leads to a number of more specific and detailed queries: What exactly does the term "enhancement" entail? Is there an implicit argument to be made regarding human nature in the enhancement debate? Do we have a fundamental right (or even an obligation) to enhancement in order to free society of "disadvantage"?

A number of these questions were addressed at the Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights Conference held May 26-28 at Stanford Law School. The event, which drew 50 speakers and 100 attendees, was sponsored by the Stanford Center for Law and the Biosciences, the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, the Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics, ExtraLife, Geneforum, and the Program in Ethics in Society at Stanford.

Human, All Too Human

Stemming from the concept of human enhancement springs the notion of "transhumanism." James Hughes, conference chair and executive director of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, defined transhumanism as "an emergent philosophical movement, which says that humans can and should become more human through technological enhancement."¹ Given this definition, transhumanists eschew the possibility that enhancements will result in a loss of "humanness," as some of their opponents believe; rather, transhumanists aim to use enhancement technologies to improve the human condition. Happiness, liberty, morality, intelligence, and freedom from disability were among the potential benefits of enhancement posed at the conference. For example, Hughes' presentation focused on the use of technology to improve moral behavior as a plausible response to those who worry that transhumanism encourages attainment of a beyond-human mind in which innate human morality will be lost.

Those who disagree with the notion of transhumanism, however, do not believe that such super-human enhancements will better the human condition regardless of our best intentions. Bioethicist Nigel Cameron, President of the Institute on Biotechnology and the Human Future (IBHF), questioned whether enhancing technologies are compatible with "humanness." He stated that our humanness will fight back against incompatible technologies. If technology threatens beneficial and innate facets of human nature, humans will safeguard against the destruction of our very essence. A number of speakers, including Cameron, questioned how we, as humans, with our limited self-knowledge, can single out the enhancements that will be beneficial from those that will be detrimental. Other speakers, including Dr. William Hurlbut, member of the President's Council on Bioethics and IBHF fellow, posed some practical problems for enhancement from a purely scientific perspective.

When it came to the issue of the right to enhancement, many presenters believed that the use of autonomy in support of enhancement is a vacuous and overused claim. Some presenters suggested that autonomy has little utility as a right in defending enhancement because it does not speak to the intrinsic value of the enhancement itself. Rather, many use the notion of autonomy as a carte blanche and isolated right to act on one's free will so long as it does not diminish another's freedom of action. In discussing germ-line genetic enhancement, philosopher Fritz Allhoff employed Kant's categorical imperative by stating that enhancement would be acceptable only if every future generation would rationally consent to such enhancement. Stanford Law Professor Henry Greely surveyed the right to enhancement within the current U.S. legal system through the lens of constitutional law, statutory regulation, and private claims, and concluded that the right to enhancement is legally limited. Although the law may not provide an explicit right to enhancement, Greely stressed that if an action is not prohibited within U.S. law, it is permitted. Although there are some actions that could be taken to regulate or prohibit enhancement, such as FDA regulations and private claims, the lack of current legal constraints speaks positively to enhancement proponents. Professor Patrick Hopkins of Millsaps College questioned the appropriateness of applying the concept of human rights to enhancement, because human rights, according to Hopkins, stem from the notion that rights are derived from the possession of a basic human nature and needs. This becomes problematic when the enhancements at issue create super-human capabilities and entities that are, therefore, no longer entitled to such "natural rights."

Enhancement and Humanity: What's in a Name?

One of the most ambiguously defined terms discussed throughout the conference was "enhancement," itself. Cameron began his discussion by pointing to the need for clear and qualified terminology when discussing technological enhancement. Presenter Laura Colleton also spoke to this concern in discussing the elusive line between enhancement and therapy. Throughout much of conference, this line was not only blurred, but, at times, it was entirely nonexistent. Often, technologies typically thought of as a therapy, such as assisted reproductive technologies that aid infertile individuals, were defined as human enhancers. If one defines enhancement in such broad (and quite possibly incorrect) terms, making the case in favor of enhancement becomes much easier.

Another interesting, underlying theme of the conference centered on defining human nature. If one does not believe that humans have a unique nature, many of the concerns regarding transhumanism are alleviated. If we, as humans, do not have a nature qualitatively different than other species, transhumanism may be viewed as just another step in the evolutionary process. Those who are enhanced may replace Homo sapiens as the next species on our evolutionary trajectory. And, if there is no biological or unique humanness to which to cling, there may be less of an argument against unbridled enhancement. On the other hand, if one believes in a unique human nature that is qualitatively different from that of other species, it provides something worth protecting, which may be threatened by enhancement technologies that go beyond the natural human scope. In addition, arguments made by transhumanists in favor of pursuing technologies that enhance the human condition may be fallacious in their assumption that we can mimic, let alone supersede, the human condition through technology.

In her concluding remarks Wrye Sententia, co-director of the Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics, stated that, regardless of one's views on enhancement or transhumanism, there is a commitment to doing the right thing and, thereby, improving the state of humanity. The issue that must be grappled with and agreed upon, however, is how to do so and what role will be played by enhancement.

Jennifer Guon is a Research Assistant at the Institute on Biotechnology and the Human Future. She is currently finishing her master's degree in biopolitics from Northern Illinois University and is beginning law school at Saint Louis University this fall.

¹ The Politics of Transhumanism, available at http://changesurfer.com/Acad/TranshumPolitics.htm.