Chairman
• Nigel M. de S. Cameron
CameronConfidential.blogspot.com
Fellows
• Adrienne Asch
• Brent Blackwelder
• Paige Comstock Cunningham
• Marsha Darling
• Jean Bethke Elshtain
• Kevin FitzGerald
• Debra Greenfield
• Amy Laura Hall
• Jaydee Hanson
• C. Christopher Hook
• Douglas Hunt
• William B. Hurlbut
• Andrew Kimbrell
• Abby Lippman
• Michele Mekel
• C. Ben Mitchell
• M. Ellen Mitchell
• Stuart A. Newman
• Judy Norsigian
• David Prentice
• Charles Rubin
Affiliated Scholars
• Sheri Alpert
• Diane Beeson
• Nanette Elster
• Rosario Isasi
• Henk Jochemsen
• Christina Bieber Lake
Christina Bieber Lake's Blog
• Katrina Sifferd
• Tina Stevens
• Brent Waters
Co-founders
• Lori Andrews
• Nigel M. de S. Cameron
Institute on Biotechnology & the Human Future
565 W. Adams Street
Chicago Illinois
312.906.5337
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Introduction
Synthetic biology, which involves engineering synthetic biological parts to create both naturally and non-naturally occurring biological systems, is rapidly gaining momentum as a breakthrough technology. By rationally creating synthetic systems, scientists expect to better understand the underlying processes and interactions between existing biological systems, and to replace or enhance those deemed inadequate or inefficient for our current and future biological needs.
The foundation for great success in this field depends on scientists' ability to synthetically mass produce many of the basic biological parts necessary for larger systems, allowing for rapid manufacture, synchronization, and reproduction of a vast array of new biological parts. Scientists hope to synthesize important raw materials and renewable energy sources, as well as complex chemical intermediates and novel organisms with unique attributes and abilities, and expect new developments to revolutionize the pharmaceutical, chemical, manufacturing, and medical industries.
This nascent field relies on the convergence of information from engineering, genetics, biology, chemistry, biotechnology, and systems biology, as well as computer modeling and information technology to accomplish its goals. At its current stage, scientists are able to synthesize the genome of many basic organisms, and can do so at relatively inexpensive rates (i.e., $1.50 per base pair). Rates are expected to continue dropping, resulting in the manufacture and sale of organisms with several million base pairs within the next couple of years.
Major Research Initiatives and Resources
At the forefront of synthetic biology is a collaborative effort under the auspices of the National Science Foundation (NSF), which includes prominent researchers and pioneers at MIT, Harvard, Berkeley, Prairie View, the California Institute for Quantitative Biomedical Research (QB3), and UCSF -- joined together in a collective known as SynBerc. SynBerc's aim, as noted on its website, is to "build biological components and assemble them into integrated systems to accomplish specific tasks." To lay the foundation for synthetic biology, SynBerc is calling for open communication and collaboration on new developments. To encourage this, they are taking a page from recent advances in computer software networking and developing an open source information bank, entitled OpenWetWare. This information bank will provide access to standardized synthetic methods for many fundamental biological parts, providing researchers with easy access to the basic building blocks of biological systems. The bank will look and function much like Wikipedia, capable of being viewed by the general public, and edited by anyone with special access. In this way, SynBerc hopes to promote collaboration and sharing of information among experts while also improving the knowledge and understanding of the general public.
Ethical, Legal and Social Implications
Synthetic biology gives rise to a number of ethical, legal, and social issues. Because DNA synthesis is relatively inexpensive and its products are capable of altering the natural evolutionary process, the possibility for misapplication is high, with much concern about the possibilities of bio-terrorism and bio-hacking. By using widely available synthetic biology methods, as set forth in the aforementioned information bank in conjunction with relatively inexpensive access to commercial labs throughout the world, terrorists could manufacture and release new strains of vaccine- and antibiotic-resistant viruses. This is coupled with concerns about the development of detection, analysis, and response measures, creating much fear and concern for national security and public health.
In addition, even well-intentioned scientists could slip up, allowing synthesized organisms with unique and un-natural attributes to escape into the wild, contaminating the natural gene pool, as well as multiplying and mutating into more dangerous strains within the environment. Other issues parallel those of biotechnology, including hubris inherent in creating new organisms, manipulating current ones, and changing the course of evolution. Future developments in this field must manage the possibility for misuse by ensuring funding for analysis, detection, and response to newly developed pathogens and viruses. In an effort to put safety and ethical guidelines into place, while also arguing against external administrative oversight, many scientists are pushing for self-regulation.
Also similar to biotechnology, intellectual property rights will play a large part in the future of this field. Because current patent laws allow individuals to gain rights to synthesized biological parts, many scientists are concerned about the monopolizing of important basic parts, which will inevitably impede research. In the meantime, by obtaining IP rights to synthetic methods for many fundamental biological parts and entering these methods into an information bank, research groups likes SynBerc hope to avoid monopolization of important foundational developments, and ensure widespread access to newly synthesized biological components.
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